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Industrial relations events such as strikes, slowdowns,
or work stoppages can have important economic
consequences for films. These episodes may impact firmlevel measures of productivity and output, especially if
workers refrain from producing. In cases where output
is contractible, adverse conditions of employment may
induce workers to lower effort in other dimensions of
production, for example, through diminishing the quality
of the product. However, a relationship between worker
treatment and the quality of production has proved
difficult to establish. Since quality is often unobserved
or hard to measure, little is known about the impact of
adverse labor relations on workers' efforts when they
are on the job and even producing at full capacity. This
dissertation sheds light on the question of how conditions
of employment affect the performance of workers by
exploring two natural experiments that allow for direct
tests of the effect of labor disputes on product quality.
In addition, I present evidence from arbitration systems
demonstrating that the precise characteristics of wage
settlements can have important implications for the
performance of workers.
Chapter 1 examines the construction equipment resale
market and assesses the impact of contract disputes
on Caterpillar, the world's largest manufacturer of
construction machinely. Chapter 2, which is coauthored
with Alan Krueger, explores whether a long, contentious
strike and the hiring of replacement workers at
BridgestonelFirestone's Decatur plant in the mid 1990s
contributed to the production of defective tires. In
Chapter 3 I construct a matched dataset of arbitration
cases involving compensation of police in New Jersey
and monthly arrest rates at the municipality level to test
whether arrest rates depend on the arbitration outcome,
the arbitrator award, and, crucially, the expected outcome.
The unifying theme of this dissertation is that industrial
relations, particularly wage policy, requires careful
accounting of employee effort. The three studies show
that the extent to which workers choose to exert effort
on the job can have economically important implications
for firms, consumers, and even public safety. The effects
are large, economically significant, and provide insight
into possible avenues through which policymalcers and
managers can mitigate these hidden costs of disputes.

2004 Dissertation Summaries

Chapter 1: Labor Unrest and the Quality of
Production- Evidence from the Construction
Equipment Resale Market
In the first chapter I examine the construction
equipment resale market in order to assess whether
equipment produced by the world's largest manufacturer
of construction machinery, Caterpillar, experienced
lower product quality in several facilities where workers
underwent extended contract disputes during the 1990s.
Since the physical quality of construction machinery is
inherently difficult to measure, I rely on resale market
outcomes to infer whether machines produced during
the dispute were of inferior quality. An analysis of
transaction-level data from auctions occurring between
1994 and 2002 reveals that resale market participants
significantly discounted machines produced in these
facilities during the dispute, by about 4 percent. Because
in any given year of production identical models of
equipment were produced in plants both affected and
unaffected by the dispute, the statistical model employed
in this paper is able to address numerous confounding
factors since I can essentially "hold constant" factors
that affected the resale prices of a cohort of models in a
given calendar year. I also find that pieces of equipment
produced in facilities experiencing labor unrest were
resold more often in the auction market, received lower
reports by independent construction equipment appraisers,
and had lower list prices in the new market relative to
other comparable equipment. Finally, I also present
evidence that resale market participants learned over
time about the change in quality corresponding to this
cohort of construction equipment, suggesting the presence
of additional inefficiencies resulting from goods being
misallocated to consumers. Taken together, the evidence
supports the hypothesis that workmanship at disputeaffected facilities declined.

Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Caterpillar Dispute
The results from this paper allow for a cost-benefit
analysis of the labor dispute from management's
perspective, since the focus of the analysis is on prices.
On balance, the analysis suggests that the equipment
produced in facilities undergoing labor disputes was
discounted by the resale market by about 4 percent.
I outline a model of the durable goods resale market
that predicts that the change in resale price for disputeaffected equipment relative to the comparison group
can be interpreted as the change in the discounted
stream of service flows~economic quality. Based on
this theoretical prediction, the analysis suggests that
equipment produced during the dispute experienced

almost a quarter of a billion dollars in lost service flows
due to price depreciation alone.
An important question to consider is whether any
ofthese large losses in service flows were internalized
by Caterpillar, or equivalently, whether prices for
new equipment were also discounted, so as to affect
Caterpillar's revenue, and to what extent these prices
were discounted relative to resale prices. The model of
the durable goods market presented in the paper predicts
that when equipment experiences increased physical
depreciation, it may also experience increased price
depreciation, suggesting that the effect of the labor
dispute on resale prices may not have fully shifted to
Caterpillar revenues. l
One approach to estimating the cost of the dispute
due to lower product quality is to assign an upper bound
on the effect of lower quality equipment on Caterpillar
revenues. Suppose that increased physical depreciation
of older equipment was fully capitalized in new prices.
The dispute would have led to a $240 million reduction
in Caterpillar revenue arising from the labor dispute.
Of interest is how this reduction in revenue compares
to labor cost savings brought about by Caterpillar's
decision to demand concessions from the United Auto
Workers (UAW). This comparison is possible since the
counterfactuallabor contract is known-the contract
Deere signed with the UAW in 1991. Prior to 1991,
bargaining in the construction equipment industry was
characterized by pattern bargaining, by which the UAW
would sign a contract with one company in the industry
and others would follow suit. In 1991 the target company
for negotiations was Deere, and a settlement resulted.
According to industry analysts at the time of the strike,
the contract signed with Deere would have increased
labor costs at Caterpillar by about $250 million over
the life of the three year contract (Kelly 1992). Over
the entire six-plus years of the dispute, the difference
in wage bills between Caterpillar and Deere was on the
order of$500 million, since in 1995 Deere signed a new
contract with the UAW that extended the base wages
set in the previous contract (Daily Labor Report 1995).
Assuming that the only costs of the strike were due to
quality reductions, and that new prices fully capitalized
future quality depreciation of dispute-affected equipment,
then the loss in revenue resulting from inferior equipment
produced during the dispute was about half as large as
the labor cost savings over the dispute period, provided
that Caterpillar reverted back to the Deere contract after
six years. If Caterpillar did not revert back to the Deere
settlement after six years, then the net present value of
breaking from pattern would be on the order of $1.4
billon, clearly outweighing the costs associated with the
quality reductions alone. However, under this assumption,
the results of the paper show that the hidden costs of the
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dispute, due to the quality reductions, are approximately
16 percent of total labor cost savings, which is quite a
sizable quantity, especially when one considers that this
estimate does not take into account the direct costs of the
strike as well as reputation costs Caterpillar may have
incurred.

Chapter 2: Strikes, Scabs, and Tread
Separations-Labor Strife and the Production of
Defective BridgestoneiFirestone Tires
The second chapter, which is written jointly with
Alan Krueger, is a second case study of the effect of
labor relations on product quality. We consider whether
a long, contentious strike and the hiring of permanent
replacement workers by BridgestonelFirestone in the
mid 1990s contributed to the production of defective
tires, which received substantial media attention in the
early 2000s. Using several independent data sources,
we find that labor strife in the Decatur, Illinois plant
closely coincided with lower product quality. Count data
regression models based on two data sets of tire failures
by plant, year, and age show significantly higher failure
rates for tires produced in Decatur during the labor
dispute than before or after the dispute, or than at other
plants. Also, an analysis of internal Firestone engineering
tests indicates that type-P23 5 tires from Decatur
performed worse if they were manufactured during the
labor dispute compared with those produced after the
dispute, or compared with those from other, nonstriking
plants.

Consumer Safety and Policy Implications of the
Bridgestone/Firestone Case
While in the Caterpillar case the reductions in product
quality had significant economic effects, the Bridgestonel
Firestone case had additional implications on consumer
safety. The results in this chapter suggest that about 46
lives were lost because of the excessive number of defects
occurring in P23 5 tires manufactured in the Decatur
plant at the time of the labor dispute. These results have
consequential implications for policymakers. We estimate
that in the absence of the tire recall there would have
been 249 additional fatalities. This estimate makes clear
the importance of government, in this case the National
Highway and Transportation Safety Administration
(NHTSA), monitoring. Additional deaths may have
been avoided had there been increased monitoring of the
tires produced in plants undergoing labor disputes. Less
encouraging are the results from the high-speed stress
tests. These tests show that tires produced at Decatur
during the dispute were less resistant to wear than tires
produced at the Joliette and Wilson plants, or tires
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produced at other times. Nevertheless, even the defective
cohort of tires were above the threshold established by
the Society of Automotive engineers for the test analyzed
in the paper. In light of this finding, existing thresholds
should be reevaluated and set to ensure minimal failure
rates on the roads.
A question that is explored in the paper is whether
Bridgestone/Firestone should have detected a break in
the defect rate prior to the NHTSA investigation. In this
chapter we ask when Bridgestone/Firestone should have
detected a problem with Decatur produced tires had they
been specifically monitoring the this facility in light of
the dispute. We estimate that by 1996 there were already
a statistically significant number of excessive claims
originating from the Decatur plant at the time ofthe
dispute relative to other plants and the years prior to the
dispute. Had BridgestonelFirestone initiated a recall in
1996, and reduced the defect rate of tires produced in the
Decatur plant to predispute levels, we estimate that 38
deaths could have been averted.

Implication of the BridgestonelFirestone and
Caterpillar Cases for the Debate over Amending
the National Labor Relations Act
Chapters 1 and 2 are pertinent to the debate for
legislation on whether the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA) should be amended to prohibit employers
from hiring permanent replacement workers during a
strike. 2 The data on Bridgestone/Firestone tire consumer
complaints and claims to the manufacturer provide a
unique opportunity to investigate tire defect rates at
relatively high frequencies. Detailed comparisons can be
made between defect rates and the precise composition
ofthe workforce at the Decatur plant during the period
of labor unrest. Monthly data suggest that the production
of defective tires was particularly high in early 1994,
around the time when wage concessions were demanded
by Firestone, and in late 1995 and early 1996, when large
numbers of replacement workers and permanent workers
worked side by side. These results accord with the pattern
of resale prices for Caterpillar equipment affected by the
labor dispute. Decomposing the resale price discount on
Caterpillar construction equipment produced during the
labor dispute by each individual year of production shows
that this discount was most pronounced for equipment
made after striking workers had returned to work, but
before they had signed a new contract with Caterpillar.
Therefore, both cases provide evidence that changes
in product quality cannot be attributed solely to an
inexperienced replacement workforce. The results suggest
that whether replacement workers are building dangerous
products due to inexperience or lack of training should
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not be the central focus in the debate over legislation that
seeks to amend the NLRA.

Chapter 3: Do Disappointing Pay Raises Lower
Productivity? Final-Offer Arbitration and the
Performance of New Jersey Police Officers
While much of our understanding of labor markets
derives from the idea that workers respond to incentives,
an emerging body of experimental work provides
evidence that psychological or nonmarket factors are
also important determinants of employee performance
(Fehr and Gachter 2000). Surveys of employers suggest
that deviations from reference wages impact worker
morale and that managers are reluctant to lower wages
(Bewley 1999,2002; Blinder and Choi 1990; Kaufman
1984; Agell and Lundborg 1999). While the theoretical
literature on gift exchange has emphasized the role of
social norms in determining worker performance, there
is little understanding of the determinants of reference
points and how workers perceive and act on surprises and
disappointments in the workplace (Koszegi and Rabin
2004). Moreover, as Verhoogen, Burks, and Carpenter
(2003) note, while the proposition that productivity
declines when wages deviate from a reference point is
commonly used by economists to explain such empirical
regularities as wage rigidities, involuntary unemployment,
and interindustry wage differentials within occupational
categories, evidence from real labor markets of this
proposition is limited.
The goal of this paper is to empirically assess
the relationship between relative wages and worker
performance in a real labor market, as well as to explore
the mechanism through which this relationship could
operate. It is a challenge to empirically identify the
causal effect of wage growth on performance due to the
scarcity of instances where a variation in compensation
is plausibly uncorrelated to changes in productivity.
Testing whether performance is affected by deviation
of wages fi'om reference points is further complicated
by the lack of guidance from the theoretical literature
on the characteristics of the comparison wage. I argue
in this paper that arbitration systems offer an attractive
real-world laboratory to investigate how on-the-job
performance of labor market participants responds
causally to changes in compensation.
The use of arbitration as a dispute resolution procedure
is prevalent in the public sector and is becoming
increasingly important in the private sector following the
U.S. Supreme COlllt's ruling in 2001 that employees can
be required to submit all employment disputes to binding
arbitration. A commonly used arbitration procedure to
resolve contract disputes is final-offer arbitration (FOA),
in which disputing parties submit offers to an arbitrator
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who is constrained to choose one of the disputant's
offers in a binding settlement. As described in the next
section, while the decision to engage in arbitration may
be cotTelated with a variety municipal finance and labor
market conditions, economic theory, as applied to FOA,
suggests that there is a random component to arbitration
rulings, and when disputing parties submit Nash
equilibrium offers, the arbitrator's ruling is random and
orthogonal to the facts of the case. Moreover, information
drawn from arbitration cases includes both the wage that
is enacted as well as the counteroffer, information that
allows for a unique perspective on the role of reference
points on employee outcomes.
I employ a dataset containing information on FAO
cases involving compensation disputes between New
Jersey Police Bargaining Units (PBUs) and municipalities
between 1978 and 1996. These data are matched to data
on monthly municipal atTest rates. Using the resulting
dataset, I test whether arrest rates are different in the
months following arbitration in municipalities where
the arbitrator ruled in favor of the PBU to municipalities
where the arbitrator ruled against the PBU. This paper
provides evidence that a tangible effect of arbitration is
discerned through recognizing postarbitration disparities
in atTest rates, depending on the arbitrator's ruling.
Specifically, I estimate that per-capita arrests were 10
percent higher in the months following arbitration when
arbitrators ruled in favor ofPBUs relative to when
arbitrators ruled in favor of the municipal employer. I
provide additional evidence that the disparities in atTests
are not the result of changing crime rates or employment
levels in police departments following arbitration.
An attractive feature of the dataset is that information
is available on the final offers ofthe parties in dispute.
Using this information, it is possible to examine the
determinants of arrest rate differentials due to differing
arbitration rulings. The degree to which an arbitration
decision is considered a win or a loss may depend on
expectations upon entering arbitration. A growing number
oflaboratory experiments provide evidence that subjects
behave as if they have reference-dependent preferences
(Bateman et al. 1997; Mellers, Schwartz, and Ritov 1999;
Thaler 1980; Tversky and Kahneman 1991). Consider,
for example, the following lottery: a person can win
$32 with probability 0.8 or lose $8 with probability 0.2.
Mellers, Schwartz, and Ritov (1999) find that losing $8
in this lottery is less painful to participants than losing $8
in a lottery where the alternative is a loss of $32. These
results suggest that preferences depend not only on actual
outcomes, but also what could have occurred in a different
state of the world.
What are the implications of surprise and
disappointment for workers in the labor market? The
natural experiments considered in this paper can be

4

motivated by the following simple example which is
similar in spirit to the experiments described in Mellers,
Schwartz, and Ritov (1999). Suppose that a worker's raise
depends on the outcome of a lottery. With probability p
she will receive a 6 percent raise in the following year and
with probability (1 - p) she will receive a 2 percent raise.
How does the outcome ofthis lottery affect the worker's
productivity? In particular, is the worker's productivity
lower if she receives the 2 percent raise relative to the
case in which she receives the 6 percent raise? Does the
productivity effect of obtaining the 6 percent raise depend
on the magnitude of the alternative point on the lottery's
support, or some other reference point? Lastly, how does
the value of p, or the probability of the larger raise, affect
her productivity following either a win or a loss?
The results of the paper show that the postarbitration
atTest rate differential between cities in which the
arbitrator ruled in favor of the PBU and in cities in which
he ruled against the PBU is not growing in the arbitrator
award, suggesting that a simple effort/wage gradient is not
accounting for the postarbitration relationships observed
in the data. Conditional on the arbitrator award, however,
the postarbitration productivity differentials are increasing
in the spread of the final offers, a result that accords with
models of disappointment aversion: the performance of
police officers following a raise depends not only on the
quantity of the raise, but on the alternative raise as well. I
also provide evidence that the decline in arrests following
a police arbitration loss is increasing in the difference
between the expected award and the arbitrator award,
suggesting that postarbitration changes in arrests are most
serious when the ruling is considered a relative surprise.
The results fi'om this paper are powerful as they
suggest a framework that can be extended in a number
of directions to answer a variety of questions that are
of interest to municipal government, policymakers,
and managers. For example, I am currently using
this framework to study the causal effect of police
performance on crime, an important question that
is ultimately difficult to address in a credible way.
Arbitration rulings affect arrest rates in the months after
arbitration through, presumably, changes in policing
tactics. Assuming that criminals do not also respond to
arbitration rulings other than through, perhaps, changes
in policing patterns, one can test whether crime rates also
respond to arbitration rulings and therefore obtain causal
estimates of the effect of policing on criminal activity.
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